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ABSTRACT
Roberto Gargarella has infused into constitutional theory a deliberative 
approach to constitutional review and rights adjudication. By this, he has 
enriched our understanding of deliberative democracy as a political system 
in which the judiciary can play a central role, especially through the institu-
tion of constitutional review. Furthermore, he has provided us with crucial 
insights into the deliberative potential of this institution, shedding light on 
the different ways in which it may serve to secure the essential conditions of 
democratic deliberation. The article centers on this twofold, crucial contribu-
tion of Gargarella – to constitutional theory and to deliberative democratic 
theory – with a focus on the relationship between social rights and constitu-
tional review. First, it presents the main controversial issues raised by this 
relationship, concerning both social rights justiciability and adjudication. 
Second it highlights the resources provided by Gargarella to understand and 
address both orders of issues, based on his account of deliberative democracy 
and constitutional review. Third, the article addresses the resulting view of 
the action of courts on social rights. In particular, it inquires into the idea of 
a “third way” for judicial action, requiring to modulate judicial review so as 
to mediate between judicial inertia and activism. 
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RESUMEN
Roberto Gargarella ha incorporado a la teoría constitucional una visión 
deliberativa del control de constitucionalidad y de la garantía judicial de 
los derechos. De este modo, ha enriquecido nuestra comprensión de la de-
mocracia deliberativa como sistema político en el que la judicatura puede 
jugar un papel central, especialmente a través de la institución del control 
de constitucionalidad. Más aún, nos ha proporcionado hallazgos cruciales 
sobre el potencial deliberativo de esta institución, mostrando las diferentes 
maneras en las que puede servir para garantizar las condiciones esenciales 
de la deliberación democrática. El artículo se centra en esta importante doble 
contribución de Gargarella –a la teoría constitucional y a la teoría de la de-
mocracia deliberativa– con especial atención a la relación entre derechos 
sociales y control de constitucionalidad. Primero, presenta los principales 
temas controvertidos que plantea esta relación, tanto en lo que concierne a 
la justiciabilidad de los derechos sociales como a su adjudicación. Segundo, 
destaca los recursos que Gargarella proporciona para entender y abordar am-
bos asuntos, sobre la base de su comprensión de la democracia deliberativa 
y del control de constitucionalidad. Tercero, analiza la perspectiva sobre la 
acción de los tribunales en materia de derechos sociales que resulta de ello. 
En especial, explora la idea de una “tercera vía” de acción judicial, que exi-
giría modular el control de constitucionalidad para mediar entre la inercia 
y el activismo judicial.
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Democracia deliberativa, derechos sociales, justiciabilidad, adjudicación, 
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SUMMARY
1. Constitutional Review and Social Rights. 2. Democracy and the Justicia-
bility of Social Rights. 2.1. Deliberative Democracy and the Adjudication 
of Social Rights. 3. A Full and Deliberative Modulation of Judicial Review. 
Conclusions. References.
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
In contemporary constitutional democracies, the protection of social rights 
is uncertain and tied to the fate of a controversial process of legal – and ju-
dicial – enforcement. In fact, the scope and means of social rights adjudica-
tion are constantly evolving and widely debated, especially in the sphere of 
constitutional adjudication. In this sphere, the exercise of judicial review on 
issues concerning social rights allows courts to scrutinize legislative acts and 
the underlying distributive choices. The possibility for non-representative 
bodies, such as courts, to review and counter the decisions of representative 
political bodies raises a counter-majoritarian difficulty, which may undermine 
the democratic legitimacy of judicial interventions on social rights1. 
From this perspective, the action of courts is particularly controversial 
in two respects. 
First, the justiciability of social rights. It is controversial whether, and why, 
social rights are amenable to judicial consideration as much as civil and politi-
cal rights2. On this issue, there has been “a significant turn towards judicially 
enforced social rights”. The debate has shifted its focus from the “the wisdom 
of giving judges the power to enforce social rights” to “a set of questions about 
the practical effect of justiciable social rights and the potential of such rights 
to deliver on the promise of social transformation through law”3. 
Second, and relatedly, the adjudication of social rights: how courts should 
address such rights, and to what extent they should thereby interfere with the 
decisions of political, legislative institutions. 
The first aspect mostly concerns the scope and justification of social 
rights adjudication, whereas the second pertains primarily to the strength 
and intensity of the judicial action within that scope.
Based on a deliberative understanding of democracy, Roberto Gargarella 
has made crucial contributions in regard to both aspects, showing also how 
they are connected4. 
1 As pointed out by bickel, A.M. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
2 In this respect, the status of social rights is controversial especially in virtue of a relationship 
with obligations that, according to some interpretations, fails to meet the formal requirements of a legal 
relationship. More specifically, it is argued that social rights do not fit a conceptual scheme built around 
an axiom of correlativity, which represents legal claims as correlative with legal duties. This view, 
however, has been challenged: first, by approaches that disconnect, both substantively and formally, 
the legal status of rights from their correlativity with legal duties; and second, by approaches that 
argue for the applicability of the correlativity scheme to the analysis of social rights and, nonetheless, 
disconnect the substantive and normative status of such rights from the correlativity with duties.
3 gargarella, r.; domingo, P., and roux, T. (ed.). Courts and Social Transformation 
in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor? Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 255.
4 Ibid.; gargarella, R. Should Deliberative Democrats Defend the Judicial Enforce-
ment of Social Rights? In beSSon, S., and martí, J.L. (ed.), Deliberative Democracy and its 
Discontents. London: Routledge, 2006, 233-252.
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First, he has provided a key to the justiciability of social rights, by pointing out 
that the scope of judicial actions does not just depend on the nature of the issues 
that fall within that scope. Rather, it mostly depends on the broader democratic 
framework within which the judiciary operates. In these terms, the justiciability 
of social rights does not depend much on the nature of such rights – as allegedly 
“positive”, expensive rights – and the possibility of effectively enforcing them by 
judicial means. Rather, and more fundamentally, it crucially depends on evalua-
tions of the nature of democratic systems and the role that courts should play in 
such systems5. Second, Gargarella has provided an account of the adjudication 
of social rights based on a deliberative conception of democracy, which points to 
an exercise of judicial review mediating between judicial activism and inertia6. 
In both respects, Gargarella’s account emphasizes what the judicial practice 
often tends to obscure: the relevance of democratic premises for the articula-
tion of a judicial discourse on social rights.
In fact, as Gargarella remarks in an insightful analysis of constitutional 
case law, courts often do not expound the view of democracy underlying 
their approach to social rights. And when they do so, they often present it 
in poor terms, especially if compared to the refined democratic arguments 
deployed in decisions on other rights, such as freedom of expression7. The 
most surprising fact, in this respect, concerns the judicial use of arguments 
that, although relying on very different conceptions of democracy – from 
the pluralist conception to the Rousseauian conception – all lead to the same 
conclusion: democracy requires political, representative institutions, rather 
than courts, to deal with social rights8. 
As Gargarella notes, however, this conclusion is only supported by certain 
views of democracy: “The argument from democratic theory does not come 
down obviously in support of the idea that judges have no role to play in the 
enforcement of social rights”9. Other views – and the deliberative view in 
particular – lead to different conclusions, pointing to the legitimacy of social 
rights adjudication:
Theories of deliberative democracy have a lot to tell us in this regard. In particu-
lar, these theories suggest that judges should be more active in enforcing social 
5 gargarella, R. Democracia deliberativa, justicia dialógica y derechos sociales. In 
Teoria politica. 2, 2012, 231-256; gargarella, R. ¿Democracia deliberativa y judicialización 
de los derechos sociales? In Perfiles latinoamericanos. 13, 28, 2006, 9-32.
6 gargarella. ¿Democracia deliberativa y judicialización de los derechos sociales?, cit.
7 Ibid., 10-14. 
8 Ibid., 10-14.
9 gargarella, R. Theories of Democracy, the Judiciary, and Social Rights. In gargare-
lla, R.; domingo, P., and roux, T. (ed.), Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: 
An Institutional Voice for the Poor? Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 13.
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rights, but in ways that are not only compatible with, but also necessary for, a 
more robust and just democracy10.
Let me focus now on this claim and Gargarella’s point that democratic premises 
crucially bear on the (1) justiciability and (2) adjudication of social rights. 
2. DEMOCRACY AND THE JUSTICIABILITY OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 
Justiciability can be defined as the amenability of a question/claim to judicial 
resolution11. More precisely, a question/claim is justiciable “when the ap-
propriate court or courts will decide it on the merits”12. As such, the notion 
of justiciability plays a crucial role in the judicial discourse, especially in 
negative terms: “cases or issues are nonjusticiable when courts will refrain 
from deciding them on the merits, asserting for various reasons that the cases 
or issues are not suitable for judicial resolution”13. This notion marks the 
scope of judicial action14, expressing the condition under which a question/
claim can be addressed according to legal standards and by a judicial body, 
describing and prescribing certain limits to judicial action. 
In a “fact-stating sense”, the notion of justiciability describes a state of 
affairs in which a question/claim is procedurally enforceable before a court. 
In a “prescriptive sense”, it refers to the “aptness” of that question/claim to 
judicial resolution, given the nature of such question/claim and the institu-
tional capacity and competence of the judiciary15. 
10 Ibid., 29.
11 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Justice Brennan defined non-justiciability as 
“inappropriateness of the subject matter for judicial consideration”, pointing out that it differs 
from a lack of jurisdiction: “in the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is 
not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court’s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the 
point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially 
determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded. In the instance 
of lack of jurisdiction the cause either does not ‘arise under’ the Federal Constitution, laws or 
treaties […] or is not a ‘case or controversy’ within the meaning of that section; or the cause 
is not one described by any jurisdictional statute”. Furthermore, Brennan identifies two orders 
of considerations that should guide the assessment of justiciability: considerations concerning 
“the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the 
political departments” and also those concerning “the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial 
determination”. 
12 tuSHnet, M., and gonzález-bertomeu, J.F. Justiciability. In tuSHnet, M.; fleiner, 
T., and SaunderS, C. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law. New York: Routledge, 
2013, 135-144, 111.
13 Ibid., 111.
14 king, J. Judging Social Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 129: 
justiciability is a “commonly employed concept for demarcating judicial restraint”.
15 According to a distinction introduced by marSHall, G. Justiciability. In gueSt, A.G. 
(ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961, 269. On the 
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Combining these aspects, the notion of justiciability serves as a filter 
through which we can separate what has constitutional relevance and lends 
itself to be adjudicated by courts from what, although constitutionally rel-
evant, does not lend itself to be adjudicated by a court.
The case of social rights is emblematic in this sense. Although contemplated 
by constitutional provisions, it is controversial whether, and to what extent, the 
content of those provisions can be adjudicated according to legal standards. 
Furthermore, even if we assume that the content of constitutional provisions 
can always be adjudicated according to legal standards, it could be reason-
able to reserve their application and enforcement to political institutions16. 
Constitutions may present areas of “non-justiciability”, left to legislative 
and political bodies to an extent that depends on the constitutional order and 
the particular issue at stake.
With respect to constitutional adjudication, justiciability tends to be in-
versely proportional to the degree of specificity with which a constitution 
regulates constitutional review:
Constitutional review can be acknowledged in the constitution’s text, as in nearly 
every modern constitution, or can be implied from the constitution’s structure, 
as in the United States. The language creating constitutional review can be more 
or less detailed, more or less ambiguous. What the constitution says about the 
scope of constitutional review will have implications for a system’s approach to 
justiciability: a broad definition of constitutional review will fit well with a narrow 
or non-existent definition of nonjusticiability; conversely, a narrow definition of 
constitutional review will fit well with a broad definition of nonjusticiability17. 
Furthermore, justiciability tends to be inversely proportional to the degree of 
specificity of constitutional norms regulating substantive issues. The more 
detailed is this content, the narrower are the margins of judicial maneuver:
The constitution’s substance might have similar implications. The more detailed 
a constitution is in dealing with a particular subject, the less room there might be 
for constitutional review, and the greater the inclination to describe constitutional 
challenges to legislation dealing with that subject as nonjusticiable. Yet, a detailed 
reference to judicial capacity and legitimacy, see also king. Judging Social Rights, cit., and 
SoSSin, L. Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada. 2.ª ed. Toronto: 
Carswell, 2012.
16 According to barak, A. The Judge in a Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009, 178-185, there are no questions of constitutional relevance that cannot be determined 
in legal terms. In this sense, those questions are always “normatively” justiciable – there are 
always legal criteria to address them. However, they might be institutionally non-justiciable, 
that is, it might be reasonable to leave them to political actors and decision-making fora. 
17 Tushnet and gonzález-bertomeu. Justiciability, cit., 111.
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constitutional provision limits the law-makers’ discretion, and courts might be 
willing to find disputes over “abuse of discretion” justiciable because they believe 
that the details provide them with clear guidance for resolving the controversy18.
In sum, the extent to which a constitution is detailed in regulating constitutional 
review and substantive issues provides some indications about the justicia-
bility of those issues in the forum of constitutional adjudication. However, 
determining such justiciability ultimately depends on further considerations 
about the appropriate scope of judicial action and, therefore, the place and 
role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. Justiciability is not a 
consideration itself to which courts can appeal in order to justify the scope 
of their action. Rather, it is the result of several considerations, concerning 
both the content of constitutions and the nature of the democratic order19.
Notwithstanding this conceptual complexity, courts often merely “declare” 
the justiciability or non-justiciability of a claim, without expounding the 
considerations according to which that claim is amenable to judicial consid-
eration or not. Gargarella sheds light precisely on this shortcoming of social 
rights case law, showing the crucial relevance of considerations about the 
nature of democratic systems. These considerations provide the premises of 
a judicial approach to social rights’ justiciability:
It is difficult to find an interesting judicial elaboration in its (more or less explicit) 
references to democracy, when it comes to cases related to social rights […] In 
many of the decisions examined, it was possible to recognize the negligence in 
the transition made by the judges from the democratic premises to the conclusions 
of what they should do, or (more commonly) not do regarding the application 
of social rights. Typically, the judges make clear their obligation to respect de-
mocracy, from there, the importance of respecting the will of the legislator, to 
sustain, based on such premises, their inability to intervene in the process that 
involves the violation of any social right20.
Indeed, qualifying questions concerning social rights as justiciable, or not, 
requires courts to appreciate the scope of their action in a constitutional 
system, under standards of democratic legitimacy. 
In this respect, Gargarella’s analysis allows us to appreciate that the notion 
of justiciability is neither merely descriptive nor only evaluative. Rather, it 
18 Ibid., 111.
19 As remarked by mclean, K.S. Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-economic 
Rights in South Africa. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2009, 109, “justiciability is the 
conclusion to a set of arguments rather than an argument itself. It is a legal short-hand of the 
courts to demarcate the issues that they will consider based on prior considerations”.
20 gargarella. ¿Democracia deliberativa y judicialización de los derechos sociales?, cit., 10.
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qualifies as “thick”, being an “amalgam of description and evaluation”21: it 
describes a set of conditions under which a claim/question can be addressed 
by a court and embeds the evaluation of those conditions, based also on 
criteria of democratic legitimacy. As such, it is applied on the basis of both 
“what the world is like” and “a certain evaluation of the situation, of persons 
or actions”22. In this sense, the notion of justiciability has a normative shape, 
that is, a shape defined by the underlying evaluative point: to apply it cor-
rectly, the descriptive content alone is insufficient and we need to resort to 
such evaluative point23.
In the case of social rights, Gargarella draws out attention precisely to 
this extremely relevant aspect. The normative shape – the evaluative point 
of justiciability – primarily concerns the understanding of the democratic 
system in which courts operate. Nonetheless such point is often downplayed 
by courts. They tend to use the notion of justiciability as a “conceptual 
shorthand”24, to label a certain question/claim as internal or external to the 
judicial domain, without expounding the evaluative point that guides the use 
of such label. In particular, courts often do not articulate the considerations 
about the nature of the democratic system and the role that courts should 
play in such system25. The democratic premises grounding judicial choices 
with respect to the justiciability of social rights are frequently left in the 
background. Furthermore, when these premises are explicit, they are often 
poorly expounded:
21 According to the distinction between thin and thick concepts of williamS, B. Ethics and 
the Limits of Philosophy. London: Taylor & Francis, 2011. wang, L., and Solum, L.B. Confucian 
Virtue Jurisprudence. In amaya, A., and Ho, H.L. (ed.), Law, Virtue and Justice. Oxford: Hart, 
2013, 111-112, point out that thick concepts have an amalgam nature, combining description 
and evaluation. 
22 williamS. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, cit., 144. 
23 In this sense, feldman, H.L. Objectivity in Legal Judgement. In Michigan Law Review. 
92, 1994, 1195, argues that thick concepts are blend concepts that “apply only under certain 
factual circumstances and, at the same time, they evaluate those circumstances”. Indeed, jus-
ticiability is “a contingent and fluid notion dependent on various assumptions concerning the 
role of the judiciary in a given place at a given time as well as on its changing character and 
evolving capability”, as remarked by Scott, C., and macklem, P. Constitutional Ropes of Sand 
or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution. In University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review. 141, 1992, 17.
24 mclean. Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-economic Rights in South Africa, 
cit., 109.
25 In this sense, mclean, ibid., 109: “despite the centrality of this notion of justiciability, 
there appears to be little consideration of what is meant by the term in the context of arguing 
whether a particular category of rights or questions is justiciable. The issue is complicated 
by the conflation, by some writers, of the notion with the different concept of enforceability. 
Clearly, the notion of enforceability is related to the notion of justiciability, but they are distinct: 
enforceability deals with the ability of the courts to fashion a remedy to protect or enforce the 
interests or entitlements it wishes to protect and enforce, while justiciability concerns the question 
of whether a matter is suitable for judicial resolution”. 
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In their arguments related to democracy, many judges at different times resorted 
(especially) to two very different notions of democracy. Some appealed to what 
I will call a pluralist notion of democracy, while others referred to what we will 
define as a more progressive, populist or participatory notion. The remarkable 
thing is that, no matter which of the opposing concepts was preferred, the judges 
tended to the same conclusion: respecting democracy requires that judges do not 
put into practice social rights26. 
Indeed, courts should not merely state that democracy is a limit to the jus-
ticiability of social rights, but should explain why this is so, in light of the 
democratic premises that they endorse. Gargarella’s analysis allows us to 
appreciate that these premises are the key to the justiciability of social rights. 
Then, it goes further and fills them with content, based on a deliberative 
understanding of democracy. 
Let me briefly inquire into these deliberative premises and how they bear 
on the justiciability of social rights.
In Gargarella’s words, a democratic system is deliberative if it fulfills at 
least two conditions: first, “public decisions” should be “adopted after an 
ample process of collective discussion” in which, second, there should be “the 
participation of all those potentially affected by the decision”27. In general 
terms, a democratic system of this sort does not exclude the legitimacy of 
judicial review: this is part of a deliberative democratic order if it contributes 
to democratic deliberation and secures some essential conditions for citizens’ 
free and equal participation in political deliberation28. 
From such perspective, Gargarella points out that social rights are justi-
ciable. Their adjudication is legitimate insofar as the exercise of judicial review 
contributes to the enrichment of public deliberation and to the guarantee of 
a free and equal participation in that deliberation29. 
In these terms, courts can play a central role in a deliberative democracy: 
they can be part of a broader deliberative setting. A complex setting that 
results from the interplay of judicial actions with legislative, political, and 
popular actions. In this respect, Gargarella’s analysis draws our attention to the 
26 My translation. gargarella. ¿Democracia deliberativa y judicialización de los derechos 
sociales?, cit., 10.
27 gargarella. Theories of Democracy, the Judiciary, and Social Rights, cit., 27.
28 In more general terms, the idea that courts, and judicial review, can support/enhance 
democratic deliberation has been defended, in different terms, also by ackerman, B.A. We the 
People. Vol. 1: Foundations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993; micHelman, 
F. Law’s Republic. In Yale Law Journal. 97, 1988, 1493; eiSgruber, C.L. Constitutional Self-
government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009; friedman, B. Dialogue and 
Judicial Review. In Michigan Law Review. 91, 4, 1993, 577-682; nino, C.S. The Constitution of 
Deliberative Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998; SunStein. Legal Reasoning 
and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
29  Along the lines set out by nino. The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, cit.
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inclusive dynamic that should characterize deliberative democracies so as to 
integrate institutional and non-institutional actors and sites of deliberation30. 
The emphasis on such dynamic also characterizes the most recent devel-
opments of deliberative democratic theory and in particular, the systemic 
approach to deliberative democracy31. According to this approach, we should 
understand deliberative democracy as a system: a complex set of actors and 
activities combined in a practice of democratic deliberation to which they 
contribute in different ways. From this perspective, assessing the democratic 
legitimacy of the various components of the system requires us to appreciate 
the deliberativeness of each component in light of its connections to the other 
components32. That is, we should look at the deliberative output of interactions 
across the system, rather than the deliberative output of the single actions 
performed by single components of the system. 
In fact, the different components can transmit aspects of deliberative 
capacity to each other. In such a dynamic, democratic legitimacy results 
from mechanisms of cross-fertilization: it is the product of a combination 
of multiple actions, fulfilling different requirements of deliberativeness33. 
From this perspective, the adjudication of social rights is one among many 
ways in which courts can contribute to the deliberativeness of a democratic 
system, in additive or in summative terms34.
In additive terms, social rights adjudication – and judicial action more 
generally – stand as a “specific method or institution” that “injects” delibera-
tion into the democratic system. Along the lines set out by Rawls35, courts 
serve as fora through which deliberation is injected into the public sphere.
30 gargarella, R. “We the People” Outside of the Constitution: The Dialogic Model of 
Constitutionalism and the System of Checks and Balances. In Current Legal Problems. 67, 1, 
2014, 1-47.
31 On the systemic approach to deliberative democracy, see manSbridge, J. et al. A Systemic 
Approach to Deliberative Democracy. In parkinSon J., and manSbridge, J. (ed.), Deliberative 
Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012, 1-26; parkinSon, J., and manSbridge, J. (ed.), Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy 
at the Large Scale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; and parkinSon, J. Deliberative 
Systems. In bäcHtiger, A. et al. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018, 432-446. Roots of this account are in Habermas’ idea of a “two-
track” deliberative democracy, advanced in HabermaS, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions 
to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2015.
32 Hutt, D.B. Deliberation and Courts: The Role of the Judiciary in a Deliberative System. 
In Theoria. 64, 152, 2017, 78.
33 As emphasized in manSbridge, J. et al. A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy, cit.
34 parkinSon. Deliberative Systems, cit., 434. bäcHtiger, A., and parkinSon, J. Mapping 
and Measuring Deliberation: Towards a New Deliberative Quality. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2019.
35 rawlS, J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. In The University of Chicago Law 
Review. 64, 3, 1997, 765-807. 
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In summative terms, deliberation is a product of the “scale and complex-
ity of a given system”36, rather than a feature that specific institutions or 
methods “inject” into – or add to – the system. It is the interaction between 
courts and other actors and venues of deliberation that makes the system 
deliberative as a whole. 
Gargarella’s view can be seen as closer to this summative account. It 
points to an understanding of social rights adjudication and judicial review 
as part of a broader set of institutions and methods that – through a dialogic, 
inclusive interaction – can produce a democratic deliberation. From this 
perspective, rather than “adding” deliberation to the system, courts should 
allow this deliberation to unfold within a system37 structured and organized 
so as to promote a “public collective dialogue” involving also citizens38. 
 
2.1. Deliberative Democracy and the Adjudication of Social Rights
Once the justiciability of social rights is grounded in deliberative premises, 
the intensity of judicial review is yet to be determined. As I remarked ear-
lier, the problem of adjudication concerns precisely this aspect: how strict 
should the judicial review of legislative acts be in order to contribute to the 
deliberativeness of the system? Gargarella’s deliberative understanding of 
democracy provides the resources to address also this problem. It provides 
the reasons for the justiciability of social rights as part of a set of institutional 
actions producing and fostering the deliberativeness of a democratic system. 
Then, it also serves as a key to the determination of the intensity of judicial 
actions, by reference to the role they play in that system. On this view, judi-
cial actions should unfold “in a respectful way towards popular authority”, 
through a “modulation” of judicial review that allows them to go as far as 
required to fit the deliberative, constitutional framework39. 
Gargarella, then, sheds light on the different forms that such modulation 
can take. For instance, courts may declare: that “a constitutional right has been 
violated, without specific remedies”; or that “a constitutional right has been 
violated and ask the State to provide a remedy”; or that “a constitutional right 
has been violated, require the government to provide a remedy, and specify 
what kinds of remedies can be adopted, how, and when”40. As an example of 
36 parkinSon, J. Deliberative Systems, cit., 440.
37 gargarella, R. Why Do We Care about Dialogue? In young, K., The Future of Social 
and Economic Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
38 gargarella. “We the People” Outside of the Constitution, cit.
39 My translation. gargarella. ¿Democracia deliberativa y judicialización de los derechos 
sociales?, cit., 21.
40 My translation. Ibid., 23.
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this “modulation” of judicial review, Gargarella cites the experience of the 
South-African, Indian, and Colombian Constitutional Courts. 
In particular, with respect to the Colombian Court, Gargarella mentions the 
doctrine of “modulation of the effects of decisions”, which aims at “harmo-
nizing the necessity of preserving the constitution with respect to legislative 
decisions”. Judicial decisions based on this doctrine can be “interpretative”, 
“expressly integrative” and “materially expansive”. Furthermore, the “modu-
lation” of their effects can be temporal, based on the postponement of the 
moment when they produce their effects41. For example, in a famous deci-
sion, regarding the abuses committed by public personnel within prisons, the 
Court recognized the validity of the prisoners’ claims, but established that 
the government would have four years to rectify the situation. Similarly, the 
Court also recognized that the Congress, rather than the judiciary, was the 
institution responsible for deciding how to end those abuses42. In this case 
and others, the Court proved able to intervene and yet be extremely respectful 
towards the authority of the legislature. These cases show how “courts can 
have a strong attitude in the protection of social rights and, at the same time, 
show respect for the legislature and, in broader terms, their commitment to 
deliberative democracy”43.
This is a“third way” that, according to Gargarella, courts should take in 
social rights adjudication: they should avoid both activism and inertia to 
stand in the middle, by crafting their decisions so to caliberate the impact 
of their interventions on political choices and actions44. In such terms, the 
modulation of judicial review should proceed, from time to time, with the 
aim of furthering democratic deliberation. Focusing on cases, and specific 
remedies, courts should graduate their action so as to support or integrate the 
political choices made through democratic deliberation, rather than impairing 
this deliberation or taking its place. 
Let me inquire further into this idea of a “third way” for judicial action, 
with a focus on the modulation of judicial review. 
41 My translation. Ibid., 26.
42 The reference is to the decision T-153/98. Gargarella also mentions a decision (T-
025/2004) in which the Court adopted a similar strategy in the case of evicted or displaced per-
sons, that is, to populations expelled from their place of residence due to political violence. The 
Court found the government’s policy unconstitutional, because insufficient and ineffective, but 
even so it did not impose on public authorities how to act. Rather, the Court stated that it would 
closely monitor the issue to ensure that the Authorities’ action decisions were in accordance with 
the Constitution and apt to solve the desperate situation of the evicted people.
43 My translation. gargarella. ¿Democracia deliberativa y judicialización de los derechos 
sociales?, cit., 27. 
44  Ibid., and gargarella, R. La revisión judicial en democracias defectuosas. In Brazilian 
Journal of Public Policy. 9, 2019, 152-168.
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3. A FULL AND DELIBERATIVE MODULATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Following a taxonomy put forward by Young45, we can choose between three 
models of adjudication: detached; engaged; supremacist. These models entail 
different degrees of judicial activism/deference towards political institu-
tions. As pointed out by Klatt46, the choice between these models requires 
us to appreciate the different institutional reasons at stake in the particular 
circumstances in which the judicial review takes place. Such reasons con-
cern the allocation of competences on the issue under consideration: on the 
one hand, the competence of political institutions to deliberate and decide 
on that issue and, on the other, the judicial competence to review the leg-
islative acts based on political deliberations and decisions. Klatt accounts 
for these reasons, concerning competences, as formal principles that can be 
conceived, as much as substantive principles, as optimization requirements 
in Alexy’s terms47. Like substantive principles, formal principles can conflict 
and when a conflict between them arises, the solution “is not to be found 
by means of interpreting competence norms. Rather, a balancing procedure 
has to be employed”48. This is a procedure according to which norms of 
principle should be balanced one against the other so as to maximize their 
fulfillment and minimize their sacrifice49. Klatt argues that we should apply 
this procedure to address the conflict arising between judicial and political 
competences with respect to social rights. We should weigh such competences 
and, then, we should strike a balance among them and set the appropriate 
intensity of the judicial control so as to maximize the protection of rights 
without disproportionately sacrificing political choices on distributive is-
sues50. The weight of competences, and underlying institutional reasons, 
45 young, K.G. Constituting Economic and Social Rights. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012.
46 klatt, M. Positive Rights: Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance. In International 
Journal of Constitutional Law. 13, 2, 2015, 354-382.
47 alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights, cit.
48 klatt. Positive Rights: Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance, cit., 364.
49 The use of proportionality review has been spreading at a national, transnational, and 
international level. On its wide circulation, see Sweet, A.S., and matHewS, J. Proportionality 
balancing and global constitutionalism. In Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. 47, 2008, 72; 
barak, A. Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012; jackSon, V.C. Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality. In Yale 
Law Journal. 124, 2014, 3094; beatty, D.M. The Ultimate Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2004; coHen-eliya, M., and porat, I. Proportionality and Constitutional Culture. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
50 klatt. Positive Rights: Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance, cit., 364. This ap-
proach applies to conflicts among formal principles the proportionality template to adjudicate 
conflicts among substantive principles concerning the protection of rights. There are different 
versions of this template, but the standard version structures the judicial analysis in three steps, 
so as to determine whether the acts under review are justified according to criteria of suitability, 
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depends on five factors: the quality of the decision that should undergo the 
judicial review; the epistemic reliability of the premises used for this deci-
sion; the significance of the material principles at stake; the function of the 
competence in a system of division of labor between judicial and political 
actors; democratic legitimacy51. 
This approach provides us a scheme to reason about conflicts of com-
petences with a focus on their intensity and the weight that the underlying 
institutional reasons carry one against the other, on the basis of relevant fac-
tors. It does not, however, provide those reasons or account for those factors52. 
The reasons for judicially interfering with political choices – or not – and the 
factors that determine their weight, depend on premises that the balancing 
scheme does not provide, but rather requires to be in place. 
As such, this balancing approach to the modulation of judicial review 
cannot capture Gargarella’s understating of social rights adjudication. First, 
it primarily focuses on the intensity of the judicial review, and the weight of 
underlying judicial reasons, whereas Gargarella’s analysis draws our atten-
tion to the scope – and democratic premises – of judicial action. Second, and 
relatedly, the balancing approach focuses on conflicts among institutional 
competences, whereas Gargarella’s view points to the integration of judicial 
action into a broader deliberative framework, encompassing institutional as 
well as non-institutional actors and venues of deliberation53.
With regard to the first aspect, Gargarella’s account of judicial review 
and social rights points to a full modulation of judicial review: it requires to 
mold the scope of judicial actions on social rights issues and, furthermore, 
to adjust the intensity of these actions within that scope. As I pointed out in 
the previous sections, the scope depends on the extent to which the judicial 
review can contribute to secure the basic conditions of a deliberative demo-
necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. More precisely, this template devises a sequence of 
three analytical steps assessing: (1) the suitability of the institutional act under review relative to 
its (legitimate) purpose (suitability test); (2) the necessity of the act in relation to the accomplish-
ment of that purpose (necessity test); and finally (3) the proportionality of the act, that is, whether 
the relevance of the interests protected by the act, and the extent to which they are satisfied, can 
justify sacrificing the rights at stake. This is the proportionality stricto sensu stage. According to 
alexy, R. On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural Comparison. In Ratio Juris. 16, 4, 2003, 
436-437, the criterion of proportionality stricto sensu guiding this stage requires that: “The greater 
the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one right or principle, the greater must be the 
importance of satisfying the other”. Under this sub-principle the “Law of Balancing” requires 
three steps by which to establish: (a) the degree to which a right or principle has fallen short of 
being satisfied or has been sacrificed; (b) the import that can be associated with satisfying a right 
or principle in conflict with the one that has been sacrificed; and (c) the importance of satisfying 
the second principle as justification for sacrificing or failing to satisfy the first.
51 klatt. Positive Rights: Who Decides? Judicial Review in Balance, cit.
52 kumm, M. The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point 
of Rights-Based Proportionality Review. In Law & Ethics of Human Rights. 4, 2, 2010, 155.
53 gargarella. “We the People” Outside of the Constitution, cit.
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cratic system. And the intensity of the judicial control should be adjusted so 
as to secure democratic deliberation through the enforcement of social rights. 
Attention to both, as Gargarella has taught us, is crucial from a deliberativist 
perspective. In particular, appreciating the scope of judicial interventions is of 
the utmost importance. Before considering the degree of control that courts 
should exercise through judicial review, we need to set the scope of their 
interventions, by taking into account the extent to which they can contribute 
to secure the basic conditions of a deliberative democratic system. 
In these terms, the modulation of judicial review is twofold: a modulation 
of review, concerning the boundaries of judicial control, and a modulation in 
review, concerning the intensity of such control. The differentiation of these 
levels reproduces the twofold dimension of social rights adjudication in Gar-
garella’s analysis. On the one hand, the dimension in which courts interact with 
other deliberative actors; on the other hand, the dimension in which courts ad-
judicate social rights and enforce them so as to secure democratic deliberation. 
In this respect, Gargarella’s account of democracy, judicial review and 
social rights serves as a framework to go beyond the deliberativist discomfort 
with judicial review. This framework allows us to modulate the judicial ac-
tion on social rights without embracing the constitutionalist assumption that, 
when it comes to rights, the scope and the intensity of judicial review are 
necessarily the widest and the strongest. Rather, they should be both adjusted 
in order to fulfill the requirements of a deliberative system. 
With regard to the second aspect, and based on the reconstruction provided 
so far, Gargarella’s view points to a deliberative modulation: it does not pursue 
a balance of legislative and judicial competences, but rather works towards 
the integration of judicial review into a broader deliberative framework, 
combining institutional and non-institutional actors and including citizens54. 
In order to fit such framework, courts should modulate the intensity of 
their scrutiny based on what their interaction with other, various, deliberative 
actors requires from time to time. From this perspective, as contended by 
Gargarella, they should avoid both activism and inertia. Being components 
of a deliberative system, they should proceed at an intermediate level and 
adjust the scope and intensity of their scrutiny to what is required, from time 
to time, to foster democratic deliberation55. A way to do so, could be to keep 
judicial arguments and decisions at a middle level, by reference to principles 
that mediate between foundational principles and intuitions about cases56. 
54 Ibid.
55 gargarella. La revisión judicial en democracias defectuosas, cit. 
56 Sidgwick, H. Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998; audi, R. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004; SunStein. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 
cit.; and SunStein, C.R. The Second Bill of Rights: fdr’s Unfinished Revolution. And why We 
Need it More than Ever. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
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Based on such mid-level principles, as argued by Sunstein, social rights ad-
judication may point to incompletely theorized decisions setting standards 
of protection on which different deliberative actors can converge57. For these 
purposes, relevant mid-level principles58 could be procedural and substantive 
principles with a limited scope and/or a limited degree of abstraction. As 
such, they could provide a justificatory ground on which different deliberative 
actors may converge in spite of divergence on the foundational principles of 
the democratic system or the specific cases to which those principles apply. 
They could serve as the focus of the judicial engagement with social rights, 
within a dynamic of democratic deliberation that involves – includes – dif-
ferent deliberative actors and concerns.
CONCLUSIONS
Roberto Gargarella provides us with a powerful theoretical framework to 
understand and address the relationship between democracy, the judiciary 
and social rights. Based on a deliberative understanding of democracy, Gar-
garella casts social rights as justiciable and embeds their adjudication in a 
democratic setting: the judicial action on social rights is legitimate insofar as 
it contributes to secure the essential conditions of democratic deliberation. 
Accordingly, courts should modulate their action. They should not refrain 
from adjudicating issues related to social rights, but should nonetheless al-
low for political actors to deliberate on those issues. And such modulation 
requires not only to adjust the intensity of the judicial scrutiny, but also to 
mold its scope within the broader democratic setting in which the judiciary 
operates. In such terms, Gargarella’s framework allows us to go beyond 
the idea that modulating judicial review ultimately boils down to a balance 
among institutional competences. Rather it must fully capture the broader 
setting in which courts should calibrate, and account for, the scope of their 
interventions, paying special attention to the democratic premises that they 
endorse. The judicial discourse on social rights has a democratic point: Gar-
garella brings it to light, to address the deliberative shortcomings of social 
rights case law and, at the same time, to point out, and then make use of, the 
deliberative potential of judicial review.
57 SunStein, C.R. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. In Harvard Law Review. 108, 7, 
1995, 1733-1772. I analyze this aspect of Sunstein’s theory also in valentini, C. Democrazia 
repubblicanesimo e razionalità deliberativa. Il costituzionalismo di Cass Sunstein. Bologna: 
bup, 2012. 
58 Along these lines, on mid-level principles and judicial review see also moreSo, J.J., 
and valentini, C. Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium: In the Region of Middle 
Axioms. Working paper presented at the workshop “Mid-level Principles in the Law”, 2019 ivr 
World Congress, Lucerne.
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